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Table 5.1 summarizes the changes that have occurred in the United States
and the United Kingdom over the longest period for which we have data
on money and income for both the United States and the United King-
dom. As it happens, both the initial and the terminal phases for this
common period are contraction phases for both countries: the initial
phase is 1873-78 for the United States, 1874-79 for the United Kingdom;
the terminal phase is 1973-75 for both. The interval between the mid-
points of the initial and terminal phases is just short of a century: 98.5
years for the United States, 97.5 for the United Kingdom.
Though our United States data on money are available for three
additional early phases (1867-69,1869-70, and 1870-73), and on income
for two, we shall generally treat 1873-78 as if it were the initial phase for
the United States in order to maintain comparability with the United
Kingdom.
1
5.1 United States and United Kingdom
Money Balances at the
Beginning and End of a Century
In the 1873-78 phase, the quantity of money in the United States was
$1.7 billion, or $36 for each of its nearly 46 million residents. In the
roughly contemporaneous United Kingdom phase, 1874-79, the quantity
of money in the United Kingdom was £0.6 billion or £19 for each of the
more than 31 million residents. This cyclical phase is centered two years
before the resumption of gold payments by the United States at the
1. We have consistently made computations for the longer period parallel to these for the
shorter period to assure ourselves that we are not biasing the results by omitting the first two
or three United States phases.
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prewar parity, so that the market rate of exchange between the dollar and
the pound sterling had not yet reached $4.8665, the parity rate that
prevailed from 1 January 1879 until the outbreak of World War I in
August 1914. The exchange rate averaged $5,242 for the United King-
dom phase 1874-79, so cash balances per capita in the United Kingdom
were the market equivalent of $100, or nearly three times as large as in
the United States.
This difference reflects primarily the greater financial sophistication of
the United Kingdom at the time, not greater affluence. Per capita income
in the United States was $173, in the United Kingdom almost exactly the
same, $171, at the market rate of exchange.
In 1776 Adam Smith was able to write, "England is certainly, in the
present times, a much richer country than any part of North America.
The wages of labour, however, are much higher in North America than in
any part of England. . . . But though North America is not yet so rich as
England, it is much more thriving, and advancing with much greater
rapidity to the further acquisition of riches."
2
A century later, at the beginning of the period we study, the part of
North America that had become the United States had a population 46
percent larger than the United Kingdom. Wages remained much higher
than in England,
3 and the United States remained "much more thriving."
In Adam Smith's time, the higher wages in North America may not have
produced a higher income per capita because of the much larger capital
accumulation in England. A century later, as just noted, our data indicate
that per capita income was almost identical in the two countries. Aggre-
gate United States income at the beginning of our period was therefore
nearly 1.5 times aggregate United Kingdom income.
4
2. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776), Cannan ed. (London: Methuen, 1930),
pp. 71-72.
3. According to Lebergott, average annual earnings of United States nonfarm employees
(when employed) was $466 in 1873 (United States Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics
of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, bicentennial edition, part 1 (Washington, D.C.,
1975, series D-735). According to Feinstein, United Kingdom aggregate income from
employment was £547 million in 1874, or £38 per capita working population, or $217 at the
exchange rate current that year (C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output
of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), table
21 for income, table 57 for working population, and table 4.9, above, for exchange rate.
4. A caveat is in order that the market exchange rate is not wholly satisfactory for
converting United Kingdom incomes to comparable United States incomes. The United
Kingdom was at the time a capital exporter, the United States, a capital importer. On this
score, domestic prices might be expected to be higher relative to international prices in the
United States than in the United Kingdom. On the other side, the United Kingdom had
much capital already invested abroad and was receiving a large income as return on capital
and other "invisibles"; the United States was in the reverse position. This would work in the
opposite direction: that is, a net capital exporter tends to have domestic prices that are low in
relation to international prices while a creditor country tends to have domestic prices thatTable 5.1 Secular Changes in Money Stock, Income, Velocity, Prices, and
Population, United States (1873-1975) and United Kingdom (1874-1975)
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2. Line 7 is line 1 divided by line 6. Line 8 is line 5 divided by line 6. Line 9 is line 2 divided by
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. ,. . Rate of Change Average Value n . , f. . n ° . . C1 _ Ratio of (Annual Percentage) Slope
Initial Terminal Terminal from of
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Phase Phase Initial Terminal Trend
(1874-79) (1973-75) Value Phase (1874-1975)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1.016 67.914 66.84 4.31 4.04
.594 32.515 54.74 4.10 3.97
1.709 2.089 1.22 0.21
57.16 646.67 11.31 2.49
0.068
2.34
1.778 10.502 5.91 1.82 1.69
31.172 55.952 1.795 0.60
32.6 1213.8 37.23 3.71
0.575
3.46
57.0 187.7 3.29 1.22 1.12
19.1 581.1 30.42 3.50 3.39
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Allowing for the difference in per capita income increases a trifle the
difference in money-holding propensities: the average United States
resident held cash equal to not quite eleven weeks' income (see table
5.2); the average United Kingdom resident held cash equal to more than
thirty weeks' income—striking testimony to the importance of the finan-
cial and economic structure for the demand for money. It produces here a
nearly three to one difference in velocity.
Like money in total, the amount held as currency rather than deposits
was also much greater relative to income in the United Kingdom than in
the United States, 7.0 versus 3.6 weeks' income. However, the greater
financial sophistication of the United Kingdom meant that the difference
in currency holdings was less than in money in total—two to one rather
than three to one—so that currency was a decidedly higher percentage of
the money stock in the United States than in the United Kingdom.
The next century brought vast changes to both countries, but much
greater changes to the United States. The population of the United States
nearly quintupled; the population of the United Kingdom less than
doubled. United States per capita income was destined to pass United
Kingdom income decisively in a very few years, and to remain higher,
except briefly during the United States Great Depression of the 1890s.
United States per capita income in dollars multiplied twenty-nine-fold—
or at the rate of 3.4 percent per year; United Kingdom per capita income
in pounds multiplied thirty-seven-fold but, converted into dollars, seven-
teen-fold—or at the rate of 2.9 percent per year—because in 1973-75 the
now floating exchange rate of the pound sterling averaged $2.34 rather
than $5.24. By this measure, per capita income in comparable terms rose
1.76 times as much in the United States as in the United Kingdom, a
difference produced by a half of one percentage point higher annual rate
of growth through the miracle of compound interest. At the end of the
are high in relation to international prices. The two would just offset if the foreign yield on
capital just equaled net export of capital; that is, if on balance all foreign income were
reinvested abroad. In this case the trade account would balance.
Some indication of the margin of error is given by converting directly computed real per
capita incomes in the two countries in 1929 prices (line 3 in table 5.2) into the same currency
at the 1929 exchange rate (which was the same as the 1879 rate). This gives essentially the
same result at the beginning of our period as the comparison of nominal incomes—roughly
equal incomes in the two countries, implying that Britain's creditor status roughly balanced
its status as a capital exporter. However, the same problems bedevil the calculation at the
1929 exchange rate. In addition, real income series constructed over such a long period are
neither strictly comparable nor without significant error. Indeed, the closeness of the two
estimates is rather surprising.
Jacob Viner's analysis of the role of changes in relative price levels in the mechanism of
adjustment of international balances of indebtedness is the classic source on this subject.
See Canada's Balance of International Indebtedness, 1900-1913 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1924), pp. 145-46,191-255; also Paul Wonnacott, The Canadian Dollar,
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period, United States per capita income was 76 percent higher than
United Kingdom per capita income at the exchange rate than prevailing.
5
The quantity of money in the United States rose much more than
nominal income—to 358 instead of 134 times its level in 1873-78. This is
the counterpart of the long-term downward trend in velocity so often
noted. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the rise in money was
less than the rise in income: fifty-five fold compared with sixty-seven-fold.
These divergent trends show up sharply in table 5.2. About 1876, the
average United States resident held just under eleven weeks of income in
money, the average United Kingdom resident just over thirty weeks; by
1974 the order was reversed, over twenty-nine weeks in the United
States, under twenty-five weeks in the United Kingdom—a change in the
United Kingdom-United States ratio by a factor of more than three to
one.
Four items presumably explain the reversal in the recorded figures:
differential changes in statistical errors, financial sophistication, real
income, and cost of holding money.
5.1.1 Statistical Errors
The recorded figures overstate the size of the change that has occurred
in the relative money-holding propensities of residents of the two coun-
tries. In both countries, the figures on the quantity of money (1) include
domestic money held by foreigners as well as by residents, and (2)
exclude foreign money held by residents.
Defect 1 makes all the recorded money figures too high. However,
sterling was internationally held in the 1870s to a far greater extent than
dollars were, whereas the reverse is almost surely true for recent years, so
the overstatement on this score has risen for the United States and
declined for the United Kingdom.
5. All rates of change cited throughout the book assume continuous compounding. The
entries in columns 4 and 9 of table 5.1 are equal to 100 times the difference between natural
logarithms of variables at terminal and initial dates divided by the number of years
separating those dates. These continuously compounded rates of change are directly
comparable (except for interest rates) to the rates of change computed from triplets of
phases, since they are calculated from the slope of a least-squares line fitted to natural
logarithms. The reason we make an exception for interest rates is discussed in section 6.6.1.
Note that the change in the exchange rate over the period is slightly greater than the
difference in the movement of the price indexes used to deflate nominal income. As a result,
the directly measured changes in real income differ a trifle less between the United Kingdom
and the United States. Per capita real income, as measured directly, rose 5.5-fold in the
United States from 1873-78 to 1973-75, or at the annual rate of 1.7 percent, and 3.3-fold in
the United Kingdom between the corresponding phases, or at the annual rate of 1.2 percent.
As a result, real income per capita in 1929 prices, converted to a common currency at the
1929 exchange rate, was only 1.70 times as high in the United States as in the United
Kingdom, rather than the 1.76 times at the market exchange rate.145 Money Balances at the Beginning and End of a Century
Defect 2 makes all the recorded money figures too low. However,
United States residents undoubtedly held currency other than dollars
(particularly of course sterling) in the 1870s to a far greater extent than
United Kingdom residents held currency other than sterling, whereas the
reverse is almost surely true for recent years, so the understatement on
this score has declined for the United States and increased for the United
Kingdom. Hence both defects make the recorded figures exaggerate the
rise in United States money holdings relative to United Kingdom money
holdings. We have no evidence on the precise size of this statistical error,
but it can hardly account for more than a minor part of the major shift in
the recorded figures.
5.1.2 Financial Sophistication
In the 1870s the United Kingdom was the world's financial center. It
had the most sophisticated and well-developed financial institutions and
was the world's banker. The world was said to be on a gold standard; it
could better have been described as on a sterling standard. The United
Kingdom was largely industrialized, and its agriculture was highly com-
mercial. Only a bit over one-sixth of the male working force and one-
eighth of the total working force, both male and female, was recorded as
in agricultural occupations.
6 The "money economy" had spread widely if
not yet to its outer limits.
7
6. For percentage of males in agriculture in 1871, see B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane,
Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p.
60; for percentage of labor force in agriculture in 1871, see Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole,
British Economic Growth, 1888-1959: Trends and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1962), table 30, p. 142.
7. See Anand G. Chandavarkar, "Monetization of Developing Economies," IMF Staff
Papers 34, no. 3 (November 1977): 665-721, for an extensive discussion of the role of
monetization in the process of economic development, and for a survey of the literature and
the empirical evidence on the subject.
Unfortunately, he devotes little attention to the aspect of monetization that is of primary
interest for our purposes, namely, its effect on the demand for money. He devotes only one
paragraph and one chart to the subject. In that paragraph, he fails to distinguish changes in
the nominal quantity of money from changes in the real quantity of money, even though the
paragraph is headed "Ratio of Money Supply to Nominal Income," and he dismisses the
subject by asserting, "There is, in fact, no systematic observed relationship between money
supply and the levels and rates of monetization or of development and national income.
Thus, there is a valid distinction between an increase in the quantity of money and an
enlargement of the sphere of money transactions" (p. 677). The second sentence is certainly
correct, but its validity does not depend on the first, which is itself an ambiguous state-
ment—though the accompanying chart does record the ratio of money supply to gross
national product rather than simply money supply. In any event, the subject deserves much
more careful study, which allows simultaneously for the effect of monetization and other
variables and is careful to assure the comparability among countries of the aggregates
labeled money supply.
It seems clear, on purely theoretical grounds, that, the relevant other things the same, in
particular, the efficiency of the items included in "money" in rendering monetary services,
the extension of the money economy will increase the real quantity of money demanded.146 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
The United States, by contrast, though wealthier and more populous,
was still financially backward, conducting its international trade largely in
sterling. Nearly three-quarters of the population was classified as residing
in rural areas, and half the working force (male and female) was still in
agriculture.
8 Production for own use was widespread, and the "money
economy" was still limited in scope.
These differences meant a much higher demand for money relative to
income by United Kingdom than by United States residents.
By the 1970s the situation was very different. New York had become
the financial capital of the world, and while the world had moved from
what was said to be a gold exchange standard to what was said to be a
regime of floating exchange rates, it could almost as well, and perhaps
better, be described as on a dollar standard. London was still an ex-
tremely important financial center, but it had declined greatly in impor-
tance. The sterling area was a pale and rapidly disappearing reflection of
the nineteenth-century British Empire.
Industrialization and the money economy had swept the United States.
Only a quarter of the population was classified as residing in rural areas,
and less than 5 percent of the working force was in agriculture.
9
The changes in the United States raised the demand for money,
perhaps substantially. The effects of the changes in the United Kingdom
are less clear. As noted, the alteration in its international position clearly
lowered demand—at least as reflected in the kind of figures we have
available. But domestically the remaining pockets of nonmoney activity
must have shrunk, and the banking system continued to spread—by the
1970s there were five times as many bank branches as in the 1870s.
1
0
The changing relative financial sophistication of the United States and
the United Kingdom must have had its major effect during the first part of
the century our data cover. World War I was a major watershed. The
United States banking system had been growing rapidly before World
War I. The war added a further fillip and in addition produced a major
expansion in the role of the United States in the world's financial system.
From 1880 to 1910, United States population nearly doubled, but the
number of banks multiplied more than sevenfold.
1
1 The fraction of the
population residing in rural areas had declined from over two-thirds to
only a bit over one-half; the fraction of the work force in agriculture had
8. Historical Statistics, ser. A-57, A-69, D-167, D-170.
9. Historical Statistics, ser. A-57, A-69; United States Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract, 100th ed. (1979), p. 403.
10. Estimate for 1870s based on sources for column 1, table 4.9 above; for 1970s, see
Britain 1979: An Official Handbook, Central Office of Information (London: HMSO,
1979), p. 344.
11. Number of United States banks in 1880 was 3,355; in 1910, 25,151 {Historical
Statistics, ser. X-580, pp. 1019-20).147 Money Balances at the Beginning and End of a Century
declined from one-half to less than one-third.
1
2 The United States was still
far less urbanized and far more rural than the United Kingdom—which
by 1911 had only 8 percent of its working force in agriculture
13—but the
difference was much smaller than in the 1870s.
This judgment is supported by the behavior of velocity in the United
Kingdom and the United States over the century—plotted in Chart 5.2
and discussed at greater length in section 5.2. The wide difference in
velocity in the 1870s was largely erased by 1905, and thereafter velocity is
not very different in the two countries until after World War II. Put in the
terms we have been using, in the cycle phase 1904-7, which is dated the
same in the two countries, money balances amounted to 23.6 weeks'
income in the United States, to 28.3 weeks in the United Kingdom—far
closer together than thirty years earlier. In the cycle phase 1920-21, after
the end of World War I, the difference was much the same: 25.7 weeks'
income in the United States, 31.3 in the United Kingdom.
In both 1906 and 1920, real income in the United States was higher than
in the United Kingdom. One would expect on this score that real balances
expressed in weeks of income would be higher in the United States than
in the United Kingdom if financial sophistication were the same, since
most of the evidence suggests that the elasticity of demand for money
with respect to real per capita income in the United States has been
greater than unity. In 1906 interest rates were decidedly higher in the
United States than in the United Kingdom, which would tend to offset
the effect of higher income, but in 1920 there was not much difference in
interest rates. The lower cash balances in the United States than in the
United Kingdom, both in 1906 and 1920, even if by nothing like so much
as in 1880, presumably means that there was still some residual difference
in financial sophistication between the two countries.
Nonetheless, the more than doubling of real balances expressed in
weeks of income in the United States in the course of the three decades
from 1876 to 1906, during which United Kingdom balances fell by 7
percent, suggests that the change in relative financial sophistication of the
United Kingdom and the United States from 1880 to 1906 was probably
by all odds the single most important factor accounting for the divergent
trends in real balances.
5.1.3 Real Income
Our earlier research indicates that the real quantity of money de-
manded generally rises in greater proportion than real income—the
income elasticity of demand for money is greater than unity—and this
conclusion is on the whole confirmed for the United States by the analysis
12. See footnote 8, above.
13. Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth, p. 142; Feinstein, National Income, table
60, p. T131, gives figures for 1911 that amount to 11 percent in agriculture.148 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
in chapter 6 below, though not for the United Kingdom. If this is so, the
rise in per capita real income in both countries should have raised the
level of money balances relative to income in the United States but not in
the United Kingdom.
5.1.4 Cost of Holding Money
The cost of holding money instead of holding other assets expressed in
nominal terms tends to be higher, the higher are interest rates on such
other assets. Here there is a sharp contrast between the United States and
the United Kingdom, itself one of the consequences of changes discussed
in section 5.1.2. In 1876 the United States was a debtor and borrowing
country and the United Kingdom was a creditor and lending country;
accordingly, interest rates were relatively high in the United States and
relatively low in the United Kingdom. In 1974 the situation was reversed.
Figures extracted from tables 5.7 and 5.8 for the initial and terminal
phases (table 5.3) highlight this contrast. Interest rates were two to four
percentage points higher in the United States in the initial phase than in
the United Kingdom, two to six percentage points lower in the terminal
phase. Interest rates were higher in both countries at the terminal than at
the initial phase, but the difference was far greater in the United King-
dom than in the United States.
1
4
These interest rate changes presumably lowered the level of money
balances demanded relative to income in both countries, but more so in
the United Kingdom than in the United States. The interest rate changes
therefore reinforced the effect of differential changes in statistical errors,
financial sophistication, and real income. All four factors worked to raise
United States real money balances relative to United Kingdom real
money balances.
This comparison between the United States and the United Kingdom
and this interpretation of their differential experience helps resolve a
major problem that has arisen about the interpretation of the secular
decline in velocity in the United States: how much of that decline, if any,
to attribute to the corresponding rise in real income, and how much to
14. These results indicate that the change in the international position of the two
countries was more important than their different price experiences. In 1876 the United
States had experienced a much sharper price fall in the preceding fifteen years than the
United Kingdom, and in 1974, a slower rate of price rise in the preceding two decades.
Hence at both dates the expected rate of price rise might have been expected to have been
lower in the United States than in the United Kingdom. By itself this would be expected to
make interest rates lower in the United States at both dates, whereas they were decidedly
higher in 1880. Of course, the change in the international position of the two countries
reflects partly a change in the internal productivity of capital. In 1876 the real yield of capital
in the United States was presumably very high, much higher than the United Kingdom at the
time and probably higher than in the United States in 1974.
For a more detailed analysis of the relation between United States and United Kingdom
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attribute to the changing financial structure. In the absence of any quan-
titative estimate of the latter effect, we have tended to attribute the
decline in velocity to the rise in income.
1
5 But this interpretation yields
elasticities of demand for money with respect to real per capita income
for the earlier decades that are higher than for later decades and that are




The comparison with the United Kingdom suggests that our earlier
work overestimates the income elasticity for the earlier periods because




In chapter 6 we explore the effect of increasing financial sophistication
in more detail and devise a procedure for adjusting our money estimates
for the United States for this effect. The adjusted money stock figures are
given in table 5.7, though for the balance of this chapter we use the
unadjusted figures.
The magnitude of the effect can be seen by a comparison of real per
capita money balances on an unadjusted and adjusted basis in the 1873-
78 phase with the single estimate for 1973-75:





year change 2.72 2.03
15. M: Friedman, The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results,
NBER Occasional Paper 68 (New York: NBER, 1959), p. 3 (reprinted from Journal of
Political Economy 67 (August 1959): 327-51; reprinted in The Optimum Quantity of Money
(Chicago: Aldine, 1969), pp. 111-39); M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz, "Money and
Business Cycles," Review of Economics and Statistics 45, suppl. (February 1963): 44; idem,
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press
for NBER, 1963), pp. 679, 682.
16. E. L. Feige, The Demand for Liquid Assets: A Temporal Cross Section Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); idem, "Alternative Temporal Cross-Section
Specifications of the Demand for Demand Deposits," in Issues in Monetary Economics, ed.
H.G. Johnson and A. R. Nobay (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); D. Laidler,
"The Influence of Money on Economic Activity: A Survey of Some Current Problems," in
Monetary Theory and Policy in the 1970s, ed. G. Clayton, J.C. Gilbert, and R. Sedgwick
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 75-135; J. V. Deaver, "The Chilean Inflation
and the Demand for Money," in Varieties of Monetary Experience, ed. D. Meiselman
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 16-21. See also M. D. Bordo and L.
Jonung, "The Long-Run Behavior of Money in Five Advanced Countries, 1870-1975,"
Economic Inquiry 19 (January 1981): 96-116.
17. This suggestion has been made before by a number of reviewers of our Monetary
History. In particular, see the comment by James Tobin, "The Monetary Interpretation of
History," American Economic Review 55 (June 1965): 464-85.151 Money Balances at the Beginning and End of a Century
About one-quarter of the annual rate of change over a century can
apparently be accounted for by an improvement in financial sophistica-
tion over roughly the first quarter of that century—since we have not
adjusted our monetary estimates after 1903. Clearly, improved financial
sophistication was of major significance.
One minor but rather interesting feature brought out by table 5.2 is the
divergent behavior of currency. In both the United Kingdom and the
United States, the ratio of currency to the stock of money declined, but
the decline was much sharper in the United States than in the United
Kingdom—in the United States, from 33 percent in 1873-78 to 11 percent
in 1973-75; in the United Kingdom, from 23 percent in 1874-79 to 14
percent in 1973-75. In the United States, the decline was produced
primarily by a rapid increase in deposits relative to income. The amount
of currency expressed in weeks of income declined only slightly from 3.6
weeks' income to 3.2. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, the amount of
currency declined substantially, from 7.0 weeks to 3.6 weeks.
The sharper decline in the ratio of currency to money in the United
States than in the United Kingdom is presumably another aspect of the
growing financial sophistication of the United States relative to the
United Kingdom. The spread of banking in the United States, the greater
accessibility of banks, and the greater familiarity with their use enabled
the public to satisfy its increased money-holding propensities entirely
with deposits. This development reached its zenith in 1929, when cur-
rency had fallen to 2.4 weeks' income. The subsequent bank failures, and
then the war, caused a return to wider use of currency until currency rose
to nearly 8 weeks' income at the end of World War II, nearly twice the
highest level ever attained before 1929. Currency holdings then declined
back to 3.2 weeks' income by 1973-75.
A more puzzling feature is that both at the beginning and the end of the
period, the use of currency was higher in the United Kingdom than in the
United States—nearly twice as high at the beginning, 12 percent higher at
the end. The lower interest rates in the United Kingdom than in the
United States at the beginning of the period would make for higher
currency holdings, but if this were the whole of the explanation the higher
interest rates in the United Kingdom than in the United States at the end
of the period should have produced the opposite result. The changing
interest rates may explain why the differential between the United States
and the United Kingdom narrowed; it cannot explain the consistently
higher level in the United Kingdom.
This subject needs much more attention than we have given it. Our
offhand inclination is to attribute the difference between the United
Kingdom and the United States to two major factors: (1) the greater
social stratification in the United Kingdom than in the United States,
which produces a corresponding stratification of individuals having and152 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
using checking accounts; (2) different legal arrangements that make the




So far we have compared the state of affairs in the two countries at the
beginning and end of the century we cover. Another way to summarize
the developments during that period is in terms of average rates of change
as measured by the slopes of semilog trends fitted to the phase averages.
We can use the framework of the quantity equation for this purpose, as
expanded by expressing real income as the product of population and real
income per capita, or, to repeat equation (4) of chapter 2,
(1) MV = PNy,
where M is the aggregate nominal amount of money; V is velocity; P, the
price level; N, population; and y, real income per capita.
Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (1) gives
(2) log M +log F = logP + log N + \o%y.
Differentiate with respect to time:
M dt V dt P dt N dt y dt '
or in the notation introduced in chapter 2,
gM + gv = gp + 8N + gy •
We thus add rates of change, instead of multiplying levels. In these terms
we have
18. We have observed that there is a fairly clear demarcation between countries in which
checks are and countries in which checks are not widely used by people in many walks of life.
This demarcation is not by stage of economic development. For example, checks are little
used in Greece and Japan, widely used in Thailand, Israel, and Taiwan. One conjecture that
we have formed is that the difference reflects a different legal situation with respect to "bad"
checks. In the United States, trying to "pass" a "bad" check is a criminal offense. This
encourages the widespread use of checks since, in effect, it reduces the risk and cost of
collection. In countries like Greece, passing a bad check is a civil offense. The writer of the
check can be sued for damages but is not liable to criminal prosecution. This discourages the
use of checks and encourages the use of cash.
Our impression is that the legal situation in the United Kingdom is closer to that described
as applying to Greece than to that in the United States. But whether this be the explanation
or not, it is clear that checks are much less widely used in the United Kingdom than in the
United States. In 1978 fewer than half of United Kingdom adults had any kind of account at
a commercial bank; in the United States, 75 percent had checking accounts in 1970. George
Katona et al., 1970 Survey of Consumer Finances, University of Michigan Survey Research
Center, Institute for Social Research, table 6-1, p. 98; article by Robert D. Hershey, Jr.,























In both countries, the change in the quantity of money clearly domi-
nated the change in nominal income—exceeding the income change in
the United States because of the sizable decline in velocity; differing
trivially in the United Kingdom because of the trivial change in velocity.
Both money change and income change were decidedly higher in the
United States than in the United Kingdom.
On the other side of the quantity equation, the similar rate of change of
prices reflects the international linkage between the two countries and the
constant rate of exchange for about half of the period (1879-1914,1925-
31). The faster rise in the United Kingdom than in the United States is the
counterpart of the depreciation of the pound sterling relative to the dollar
after 1931, and then again after World War II. Both population and real
income grew less rapidly in the United Kingdom, much more than
offsetting the more rapid rate of price rise, so nominal income rose only
four-fifths as fast—4.0 compared with 4.9 percent.
As noted, the differential behavior of velocity reinforced the effect of
the slower rate of rise in nominal income in the United Kingdom, so that
the quantity of money rose only two-thirds as rapidly (instead of four-
fifths, like income) in the United Kingdom as in the United States.
The changes we have summarized in this section did not of course
proceed evenly. Section 5.2 describes the fluctuations of the levels of the
various series around their trends, and section 5.3, of the rates of change.
5.2 Long Swings in the Levels of
Money, Income, and Prices
Chart 5.1 plots the phase values of the nominal money stock at the
middates of the corresponding phases for the United States and the
United Kingdom. (The numerical values except for the United States
money stock before 1902 are given in tables 5.7 and 5.8, sec. 5.5.)
For both countries, the phase values for the nominal money stock show
long undulating movements about the semilog straight-line trends plotted
on the chart.154 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
U.S. billions of dollars
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Phase values of United States and United Kingdom nominal
money stock.
For the United States, we have discussed in detail in A Monetary
History the proximate reasons for these movements in the stock of
money: the initial relatively slow rate of growth and the speeding up
around 1880 reflect preparation for resumption and then the aftermath of
resumption; the sharp retardation in the 1890s reflects the monetary
disturbances associated with the agitation for free silver; the subsequent
acceleration beginning around 1895 is partly a reaction to these disturb-
ances, partly a result of the worldwide expansion in gold supplies follow-
ing new discoveries and the practical application of the cyanide process in155 Long Swings in the Levels of Money, Income, and Prices
extracting gold from low-grade ore; the mild retardation after about 1905
reflects the end of the reaction to the earlier stagnation in an environment
in which gold production continued at a fairly rapid rate; the rapid
acceleration after 1913 and then sharp retardation reflect World War I
monetary expansion and the postwar tight money policy that the Federal
Reserve System imposed in 1920; the absolute decline after 1928 reflects
the monetary collapse associated with the Great Contraction that termi-
nated in the banking holiday of 1933; the subsequent rapid rate of growth
was speeded up even more by the financing of World War II, which was
followed by a distinct slowing up until about 1960, when monetary
expansion accelerated.
It is a striking sign of the close financial links among major countries
that the United States and United Kingdom figures show such similar
patterns. World Wars I and II and their postwar aftermaths leave a
similar imprint on the charts for the two countries and produce undula-
tions that have a close family resemblance. Yet there are also important
differences that mirror the different internal experiences of the two
countries.
1. The sharp retardation of growth in the United States money stock in
the 1890s has no counterpart in the United Kingdom data, just as the
agitation for free silver that produced the United States retardation had
no counterpart in the United Kingdom.
2. Despite the worldwide expansion of gold production after the
1890s, United Kingdom monetary growth slows down in the early 1900s
and only starts accelerating after about 1907. This reversal of the United
States pattern is almost certainly a consequence of that pattern, though it
very likely was reinforced by the effect of the Boer War on the United
Kingdom balance of payments. As the rapid United States expansion
generated balance of payments surpluses and attracted gold, the United
Kingdom had to surrender gold—or, more accurately, was able to attract
an inordinately small share of newly mined gold. The resulting retarda-
tion in United Kingdom monetary growth is the other side of the accel-
eration in United States monetary growth. Then, as the United States
experienced retardation, the United Kingdom was able to join the world-
wide acceleration.
3. In World War I, the money stock rose slightly less in the United
States than in the United Kingdom—from the phase centered on 1914 to
the phase centered on 1920 the stock of money rose 105 percent in the
United States and 126 percent in the United Kingdom. There was no
corresponding difference in the growth of nominal income, which rose
125 percent in the United States and 123 percent in the United Kingdom.
However, the further breakdown between prices and output was very
different. In the United States, prices rose 81 percent and output rose 25156 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
percent; in the United Kingdom, prices rose 141 percent, while output
actually fell by 8 percent.
4. The much greater rise in United Kingdom than in United States
prices plus the determination of the United Kingdom to return to gold at
the prewar parity produced a striking difference in the postwar behavior
of the money supply. After a mild retardation attributable to the immedi-
ate postwar deflation, the United States money stock continued to rise at
roughly its long period trend rate until the onset of the Great Depression.
The United Kingdom money stock declined sharply until 1925 as part of
the deflationary policy that preceded Britain's return to gold. It then
started to rise, though at a very slow rate, until 1930.
This pattern in the United Kingdom reproduces, though on a con-
densed time scale and about a much flatter trend, the behavior of the
United States money stock after the Civil War. The decline relative to
trend in the United States money stock from 1865 to 1879,
1
9 when the
United States returned to gold at the pre-Civil War parity, is the counter-
part of the absolute decline in the United Kingdom money stock from
1920 to 1925, when the United Kingdom returned to gold at the pre-
World War I parity. The acceleration of monetary growth in the United
States after 1879 is the counterpart of the slower acceleration in the
United Kingdom after 1925.
5. The United States money stock falls sharply from the phase cen-
tered on 1928.5 to the phase centered on 1935.0. The United Kingdom
money stock accelerates its rate of growth after the phase centered on
1931. The reason is clearly that the United Kingdom departed from gold
in September 1931 and the United States not until March 1933. As a
result, the contraction came to an end in the United Kingdom earlier than
in the United States and was nothing like so severe (as we shall see below,
the behavior of income parallels that of the money stock in both coun-
tries).
6. In World War II, the money stock rose more rapidly in the United
States than in the United Kingdom—the opposite of the relation in World
War I. From the phase centered on 1938 to the phase centered on 1949,
the money stock rose 224 percent in the United States and only 152
percent in the United Kingdom. Nominal income shows a parallel differ-
ence, rising by 174 percent in the United States and by 111 percent in the
United Kingdom. This time the whole of the difference in the rise in
nominal income is accounted for by a different behavior of real income,
and none by prices. In both countries, prices rose by nearly 80 percent,
but this price rise was accompanied by a more than 50 percent increase in
19. Though we have reasonably accurate estimates only from 1869 on, other evidence
suggests that the decline dates from 1865.157 Long Swings in the Levels of Money, Income, and Prices
output in the United States and by less than a 20 percent increase in the
United Kingdom.
7. The most fascinating feature about the post-World War II behavior
is the close similarity in the rate and pattern of monetary growth, except
for the much sharper acceleration in the final phases in the United
Kingdom than in the United States. In both countries, monetary growth
accelerated slightly in the early fifties during the Korean War, then
slowed down, then speeded up appreciably after 1960. For a time this
final acceleration was more marked in the United States than in the
United Kingdom, but then the United Kingdom took the lead—if that is
the right word—with a decisive spurt at a rate comparable to the prior
record in World War I.
The main postwar pattern in both countries, as table 5.4 brings out, is
an acceleration in money in the double sense of a rising rate of growth and
also a shortening of the length of the successive step-ups in growth,
though the first step does average out the acceleration and retardation
associated with the Korean War. In both countries, nominal income at
first rose more rapidly than money—the counterpart of the postwar
rebound in velocity—but then, in the third period, the reverse occurred
as velocity fell. The result was a less rapid acceleration in nominal income
growth than in money growth, but a decided acceleration nonetheless,
except only between the first two periods for the United Kingdom.
The most interesting feature of the postwar experience is the division
of the nominal change between prices and output. The percentage
absorbed by prices was consistently higher in the United Kingdom. In
both countries it was roughly the same in the first two periods, but it rose
even more sharply in the final period than did the rate of growth of
nominal income, with the result that while output growth rose between
the first two periods, it fell between the second and third. This is the much
discussed postwar shift in the empirical Phillips curve, to which we shall
return in chapter 9.
2
0
Given the appreciable differences between the two countries in the
long-term movement of the nominal money stock, do these differences
leave their imprint on the long-term movements of nominal income?
Panel 1 of chart 5.2 gives a clear affirmative answer. The striking feature
of this chart is that the movements in nominal income differ between the
two countries in the same way as the movements in money. In each
country separately the undulations in nominal income mirror to a re-
markable degree the undulations in the stock of money.
In the United States, the trend in money is steeper than in income; in
the United Kingdom they are roughly the same. However, this apparent
20. M. Friedman, "Inflation and Unemployment" (Nobel Lecture), Journal of Political
Economy 85 (June 1977): 451-72.8*
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Chart 5.2 Phase values of United States and United Kingdom nominal
income and nominal money stock and velocity.160 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
difference conceals a similarity. In both countries, the trend in money is
steeper than that in income from World War I to the end of World War II,
and much less steep thereafter. This is the phenomenon discussed in
section 5.1; it is reflected in the downward trend in United States velocity
to the end of World War II, and the upward trend thereafter (panel 2 of
chart 5.2), and in the roughly horizontal trend in United Kingdom
velocity to World War I, the downward trend to the end of World War II,
and the upward trend thereafter.
The undulations about the trends are, however, common to money and
income, as is clear from the greater steadiness of the velocity series in
each country than of either the money or the income series. In neither
country does either the money or the income series have an appreciable
movement that does not have a counterpart in the other—with one
possible exception, already referred to, which interestingly enough is the
same for the two countries. That exception is for roughly the decade of
the 1950s. In both countries, income rose decidedly faster during the
1950s than money—that is, velocity rose sharply rather than falling as it
had for most of the prior seven decades in the United States and rather
than remaining stable or falling as it had for the prior eight decades in the
United Kingdom. But this exception is temporary. In the decade of the
sixties, money and income resumed their parallel movement in the
United States and came much closer to parallelism in the United
Kingdom.
The velocity series highlights the discrepancies between the undula-
tions in the money and income series. One fascinating feature of the
velocity series for the two countries is their extraordinary similarity,
especially after 1905, when the sharp fall in United States velocity relative
to United Kingdom velocity came to an end (see panel 2 of chart 5.2).
From 1905 on, a single description will suffice for both countries:
velocity rose in the later stages of the World War I period, then declined,
recovering slightly in the 1920s; velocity fell sharply in the Great Contrac-
tion, rose again at the beginning of World War II, fell sharply during the
war, rose sharply thereafter to the middle or late sixties, then fell mod-
erately. The only major difference after 1905 is the greater amplitude of
the post-World War II movements in the United Kingdom than in the
United States.
The two war periods are especially intriguing—in the first, velocity rose
and in the second velocity fell, alike in the two countries. Presumably,
this reversal must have reflected other differences that were also common
to the two countries. Similarly, velocity rose sharply after World War II
in both countries. One explanation offered for the United States has been
the rapid growth of shares in savings and loan associations, which nearly
quadrupled between 1950 and 1960, going from a total equal to about 9161 Long Swings in the Levels of Money, Income, and Prices
percent of the money stock to nearly 30 percent.
2
1 The United Kingdom
experienced a similar phenomenon: building societies' shares and de-
posits roughly tripled over the corresponding period, rising from a total
equal to 14 percent of the money stock to 35 percent.
2
2 This common
rapid expansion may have had different sources in the two countries
(e.g., there was no development in the United Kingdom comparable to
the extension in the United States in 1950 to savings and loan shares of
insurance provisions identical with those for commercial bank deposits),
but the occurrence of the same phenomenon in both, along with a similar
behavior of velocity, adds to the evidence that this explanation has merit.
We analyze these features of the behavior of velocity in greater detail in
chapters 6 and 7 below.
The changes in the money and income series in chart 5.2 can be
regarded as the composite of changes in prices and in real magnitudes,
and the latter, in turn, of changes in population and per capita real
magnitudes. Of these three components, population behaves most
smoothly (see chart 5.3 and table 5.5). For both countries, population
accounts for an appreciable part of the trend in the aggregate series but
for a trivial part of the undulations about the trend.
The trend of prices is very different before and after 1914. The period
before 1914, taken as a whole, is a period of roughly stable prices in both
countries, though of course with considerable variation about the trend.
The period after 1914, on the other hand, is a period of rising prices in
both countries, interrupted only during the interwar period. For the
post-1914 period as a whole, the rate of rise averages over 2 percent in the
United States, 3 percent in the United Kingdom. This post-1914 price
trend accounts for less than 40 percent of the total trend in nominal
income and the nominal money stock in the United States, but for more
than 60 percent in the United Kingdom, the steeper United Kingdom
price trend being reinforced by a flatter trend in both population and per
capita real magnitudes.
The different trend in prices before and after 1914 is not matched by
any corresponding difference in the trend of real output per capita. In
both the United Kingdom and the United States, per capita output has a
slightly higher trend rate after 1914 than before: in the United States, 1.8
versus 1.6; in the United Kingdom, 1.5 versus 1.2. Because population
grew more slowly in both countries after 1914, the slightly more rapid
trend rate of growth in per capita output is converted into a slower rate of
growth in total output in both countries after 1914 than before.The most
21. M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz, Monetary Statistics of the United States, table 1,
cols. 7 and 10, pp. 40-47.
22. D. K. Sheppard, The Growth and Role of U.K. Financial Institutions, 1880-1962
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interesting feature of chart 5.3 and table 5.5, however, is what they say
about the variability of various magnitudes about the trend.
Most important, nominal money is, with one exception (pre-1914 for
the United Kingdom), less variable than nominal income, though per
capita real money is uniformly more variable than per capita real income.
This apparent contradiction is in fact wholly consistent with the theoreti-
cal analysis of chapter 2—as reflected for example in chart 2.3. That
analysis suggests that a maintained change in the rate of change of money
will ultimately produce an equal maintained change in the rate of change
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change of both nominal income and prices must overshoot in order to
raise nominal income and prices to new levels consistent with an altered
desired velocity—a higher rate of monetary growth raising desired veloc-
ity, a lower rate lowering desired velocity.
The effect is to produce a wider amplitude of movement in nominal
income and prices than in nominal money—which is precisely what table
5.5 shows, with two minor exceptions (the lower variability of income
than of money in the United Kingdom pre-1914 and of prices than of
money in the United States after 1914). The wider fluctuations in prices
than in money produce a negative relation between fluctuations in nomi-164 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
nal balances and real balances—which is precisely what is required for the
standard deviation of the fluctuations about the trend to be smaller for
the logarithm of money than for one or more of its components, the
logarithm of real balances and the logarithm of prices.
2
3 Because they can
be reflected positively in nominal income as well as negatively in real
income, the wider fluctuations in prices than in money need not produce
as numerically large a negative correlation between the fluctuations in
prices and output as between fluctuations in nominal and real balances,
and may even be consistent with a positive correlation between prices and
output; hence the standard deviation of the nominal income fluctuations
can be larger than in any of its components, as it is except for the United
Kingdom before 1914. Finally, the same reasoning explains why real
balances uniformly fluctuate more widely about trend than output.
Another striking feature of the measures of variability in table 5.5 is
that every magnitude is more variable for both countries after 1914 than
before. This feature is closely related to the preceding. First, price
fluctuations play a dominant role in the long-period undulations of the
nominal magnitudes about trend. Population and output are constrained
by physical limits. There are no such limits for prices—as has been
demonstrated most dramatically in hyperinflations when prices have
risen astronomically. That is why commodity standards such as gold or
silver standards have emerged or been adopted—to provide physical
limits to the stock of money. Second, price fluctuations have indirect
effects that infect real magnitudes, both real balances, for reasons already
indicated, and output, because wider price fluctuations increase
uncertainty and instability. Third, from 1879 to 1914, the gold standard
operated largely unchecked in both the United States and the United
Kingdom. It limited the range of fluctuations in prices and hence in all
magnitudes in table 5.5—though even then prices varied more than either
real balances or output per capita. The widest fluctuations in prices in
both the United States and the United Kingdom occurred when the
physical limit imposed by a gold standard was absent or relatively ineffec-
tive—the sharp collapse in prices in in the United States from the Civil
War to 1879 and the major rises in both countries during the two world
wars, and in the United Kingdom after World War II. The post-1914
period is more variable than the pre-1914 period because it is the period
when commodity standards were replaced by fiduciary or fiat standards
and no effective substitute developed for the physical limits imposed by a
commodity standard.
23. Recall that
so that unless r^y is negative, 0% + y must be larger than either o^or 0$ ; and it may be larger
even though rxy is negative, provided the absolute value of the correlation is low enough.165 Long Swings in the Levels of Money, Income, and Prices
Insofar as the quantity of money demanded is negatively affected by
the variability of prices (see sec. 2.4.1, point 4), the shift from a commod-
ity to a fiduciary or fiat standard presumably was a factor tending to raise
velocity in both countries, but it clearly was not a dominant factor, at least
between the two wars.
The importance of prices for the long-period undulations in nominal
magnitudes is of great significance for the understanding of economic
developments. In particular, it means that the long swings in monetary
magnitudes to which so much attention has been devoted are largely a
price phenomenon, which has important implications for their explana-
tion. We shall return to this matter in chapter 11.
Chart 5.3 contains one series not so far discussed; money stock per unit
of output, a ratio of money stock to real income in 1929 dollars. If the
quantity theory held in its most rigid and extreme form, so that the
velocity of money was numerically an unchanging constant, prices and
the quantity of money per unit of output would be strictly proportional to
one another, the proportionality factor being the reciprocal of the veloc-
ity of money.
2
4 Except for the differences in the trend of prices and of the
quantity of money per unit of output, the rigid relation comes very close
indeed to being realized for both countries. The movements in the two
series at>out their trends mirror one another faithfully, except for the one
episode referred to earlier—the decade of the 1950s, when the sharply
rising velocity in both countries is reflected in the opening up of a
widening gap between prices and money per unit of output.
5.3 Rates of Change of Money, Income, and Prices
As we noted in chapter 3, rates of change provide an alternative, and
frequently superior, way to isolate fluctuations about trends.
Chart 5.4 is the counterpart of chart 5.2, except that it plots rates of
change rather than absolute levels. (Except for the United States money
stock and velocity before 1902, the numerical values are given in tables
5.9 and 5.10.) It brings out even more strikingly the high degree of
consilience between the movements in the quantity of money and in
nominal income we remarked on in discussing chart 5.2. Rates of change
are notoriously erratic. Yet there is scarcely a movement of any size in the
money series that does not have its counterpart in the income series, and
conversely. Out of forty-eight successive movements in the rates of
24. From equation (4) in chapter 2,
M 1
p
where -y is the quantity of money per unit of output.166 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
Table 5.5 Components of Trends and Fluctuations about Trend
in Money Stock and Income
United States: 1873-1975, 1873-1914, and 1914-75
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Lines 1, 2, 3, 4: Slopes of semilogarithmic trends fitted to indicated magnitudes.
Lines 5, 6, 7, 9: Standard deviations of the deviations of the logarithms of the magnitudes in
question from a semilogarithmic trend.
Line 8: If U = X + Y + Z (e.g., log money = log population + log per capita real money + log
prices), then
change for the United States and thirty-four for the United Kingdom,
forty-one in the United States and twenty-five in the United Kingdom are
in the same direction in both series, some of the exceptions involve
movements that are small in magnitude, five of the seven exceptions for
the United States and five of the nine exceptions for the United Kingdom
are during World War II and the early postwar period, and two of the
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Because the sum in the bracket is based on a sum of squares, it must be positive. The
square root of that sum (times 100) is given in line 9. Similarly, the first three terms in the
bracket must also be positive, and their square roots are given in lines 5,6, and 7. However,
the remaining terms may be positive or negative, and so may their sum. Strictly speaking,
when it is, its square root is imaginary. Instead, in order to indicate the size and the direction
of the interaction, we have changed the sign of such negative sums, extracted the square
root, and then designated the square root by a minus sign. That is why we have entered the
numbers in the table in brackets.
World War I. In both countries, once the wartime readjustments were
completed, the relation returned to its prewar closeness.
For the United States, the first sizable discrepancy in movement is from
the triplet of phases centered on 1878-82 to the triplet centered on
1882-85, when the money series rises and the income series declines. We
are inclined to attribute this discrepancy to the effect of resumption
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Chart 5.4 Rates of change of United States and United Kingdom nom-
inal income, nominal money stock, and velocity.169 Rates of Change of Money, Income and Prices
dollars, in particular by leading to the substitution of dollars for foreign
currencies by persons and firms engaged in foreign trade. For nearly a
half-century thereafter there is no appreciable discrepancy, only one
minor difference in direction (from the triplet centered on 1892-94 to that
centered on 1894-95), though there are some sizable differences in
amplitude of movement associated with World War I. The second sizable
discrepancy in amplitude, though not in direction of movement, occurs in
the period of the Great Contraction, when the rate of change in income
fell to much lower levels than the rate of change in money. We are
inclined to believe that the widespread bank failures in 1931,1932, and
early 1933 made this deviation smaller than might have been anticipated.
The bank failures reduced the attractiveness of money as an asset and so
moderated the sharp reduction in velocity that might have been expected
as a result of the rapid rate of fall of prices, the decline in interest rates,
and the great uncertainty about future economic developments. It is
noteworthy that velocity fell much more sharply in Canada, where there
were no bank failures, than in the United States, although economic
conditions were otherwise very similar.
2
5 The remaining discrepancies all
come during and after World War II, the opposite movements in the rate
of rise in money and in income reflecting first the wartime decline in
velocity and then the postwar reaction of velocity.
For the United Kingdom, the first sizable discrepancy is between the
triplet of phases centered on 1888.5 and the second succeeding triplet
centered on 1897, when the rate of rise of nominal income first decreases
then increases slightly, while that of money first increases then decreases.
During and after World War I, there are two discrepancies in the
direction of movement of the rates of change of money and income, one
minor, the other appreciable. The larger discrepancy reflects the postwar
reaction to the wartime rise in velocity, which produced a larger decline
in income than in money—essentially the same pattern as in the United
States.
The remaining discrepancies in movement are all for the World War II
period, which again duplicates the United States pattern: the rate of
change of money first overshoots the rate of change of income, then
declines substantially below the rate of change of income, then closes the
gap as the two rates of change come together. The only difference in the
patterns for the two countries is that it took longer in the United Kingdom
than in the United States for the rates of change of money and income to
come back together. In the United States, the discrepancy is largely
eliminated by the early 1960s; in the United Kingdom, not until the later
1960s.
This difference may well have reflected a phenomenon for the United
Kingdom the reverse of that which we noted for the resumption period
25. See A Monetary History, p. 352.170 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
for the United States: the replacement of the pound by the dollar as the
preferred international currency. The changes in the exchange rate of the
pound relative to the dollar, interpreted as due to United Kingdom, not
United States, instability, reduced the quantity of pounds demanded.
The end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 presumably had a similar
effect on the dollar, but that came too late in our period to show up in our
rate of change series.
The wartime deviations offer a fascinating puzzle: they are essentially
identical in the two countries in each war, but in both countries the
pattern in World War I is the reverse of the pattern in World War II. In
World War I, income is more volatile than money (velocity first rises and
then declines); in World War II, money is more volatile than income
(velocity first declines and then rises). In our Monetary History, we
explained the World War II decline in velocity in the United States by
price controls, the unavailability of consumer durable goods, and the
expectation of a postwar contraction accompanied by declining prices.
"World War I," we wrote, "differed markedly from World War II with
respect to both the availability of goods and expectations about the
postwar behavior of prices and incomes. 'Shortages' and 'controls' in
World War I were nowhere nearly so sweeping as in World War II, and
no major branch of civilian production suspended output entirely. World
War I came after nearly two decades of generally rising prices, when the
climate of opinion was characterized by belief in unlimited future poten-
tialities rather than by fear of secular stagnation."
2
6
Both wars involved much more serious economic dislocations for
longer periods in the United Kingdom than in the United States—which
is presumably why the return to normal took longer in the United
Kingdom after both wars. But the contrast between the two wars in price
controls, availability of goods, and public expectations was much the
same in the United Kingdom as in the United States.
The financial policy of the two countries is an additional factor, not
sufficiently stressed in our Monetary History, that was common to the two
countries but different between the two wars and that may have contri-
buted to the reversal in the behavior of velocity. In both countries,
interest rates rose fairly sharply during World War I but fell during World
War II. Partly, this different movement of interest rates reflected the
different economic circumstances before the outbreak of war. Mostly it
reflected a deliberate government policy of keeping interest rates low
during World War II. The effect on velocity was reinforced by the much
more extensive and effective official control of prices during World War
II in both countries than during World War I. In an interesting disserta-
tion on repressed inflation, Juan Toribio, adducing both theoretical
considerations and empirical evidence, argues persuasively that repres-
26. A Monetary History, p. 560.171 Rates of Change of Money, Income and Prices
sion of inflation leads to a highly interest-elastic demand curve for
money.
2
7 If this is so, the low controlled interest rates may have induced
the public to hold in the form of money an unusually large fraction of the
liquid assets they accumulated for the other reasons cited.
These discrepancies do not belie the close similarity between the
rate-of-change series in each country for money and income. Indeed, the
money and income series show such a remarkable similarity that it seems
worth emphasizing that, so far as we are aware, the basic data on money
and income from which they are derived are completely independent
measurements that have no arithmetically common elements. The money
data come primarily from the records of government monetary author-
ities and of banks; the income data, from a great variety of sources of
which monetary authorities and banks contribute at most only that mite
that corresponds to their expenditures for factor services. The similarity
between the two series in each country does not reflect any spurious
correlation arising from reliance on common data. It rather occurs de-
spite independent errors of measurement in the data underlying the two
series, and despite the brevity of many phases that limits averaging out of
such errors in computing phase averages. The similarity records an
economic phenomenon that must be explained in economic terms.
The similarity of movement says nothing in and of itself about direction
of influence. It is consistent with changes in money producing corre-
sponding changes in income, or with changes in income producing
changes in money, or with changes in both money and income being the
common consequence of changes in still other variables.
One quantitative measure of the similarity in the movements of the
rates of change in money and income is the correlation coefficient be-
tween them, which, for the period as a whole is 0.86 for the United States,
0.84 for the United Kingdom (table 5.6, line 1). This means that at least
74 percent for the United States and at least 71 percent for the United
Kingdom of the variation in each series can be accounted for by the
systematic element it has in common with the other series. If the nonsys-
27. The essence of his theoretical argument is that, if some goods are rationed at
controlled prices, all substitution has to take place among the unrationed goods, which
raises the cross-price elasticities among them. Given the extensiveness of rationing at
controlled prices in the United Kingdom during World War II, he concludes that, "A British
holder of liquid assets had practically closed all possibility of choice except the alternative of
buying bonds or keeping his cash balances." He goes on to say that, "In the extreme case, if
all goods other than money and securities were rationed, it is conceivable that a liquidity
trap might appear in the money market." His empirical evidence consists of relating velocity
to interest rates for so-called free market periods and the repressed inflation period
1940-49. He finds small, often statistically insignificant interest elasticities for "free-
market" periods, much larger, and statistically significant, elasticities for the repressed
inflation period. Juan Toribio, "On the Monetary Effects of Repressed Inflation," Ph.D.
diss., University of Chicago, 1970, especially pp. 118-31; quotation from p. 122.5 oo*
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6 b b b b173 Rates of Change of Money, Income and Prices
tematic element were equally important for money and for income, the
correlation coefficients themselves would measure the fraction of
variability that money and income have in common—or 86 percent for
the United States, 84 percent for the United Kingdom.
2
8
28. The usual way of describing the squared coefficient of correlation (r
2) between two
series, say M (for the rate of change in money) and Y (for rate of change of income) is to
describe it as giving "the fraction of the variation in Y accounted for by M," or, alterna-
tively, "the fraction of the variation in M accounted for by Y." But this description is highly
special, really a limiting description. Only one of these two statements can be correct—they
are alternatives, not simultaneously valid statements. In the usual statistical jargon: the first
assumes M to be fixed or exogenous or measured without error; the second assumes Yto be.
A more meaningful description is the one given in the text—that r
2 is the minimum
fraction of the variation in Y and in M accounted for by the systematic element they have in
common. To see that this is a valid description, we may use the permanent-transitory
approach of Milton Friedman, A Theory of the Consumption Function. Let us assume that
we can regard both M and Yas the sum of a systematic element which is common to the two
and a nonsystematic element— these being the counterpart here to the "permanent" and
"transitory" components of income and consumption. For simplicity we may assume that all
variables are measured as deviations from their means so all average zero. Let
(a) M = MP + Mt
(b) Y=YP + Yt
define the division of each into a systematic component, designated by subscript p, and
nonsystematic component, designated by t. As in the consumption counterpart, assume that
M, and Mp, and also Yp and Y,, and M, and Y, are uncorrelated, and that
(c) Yp = kMp
expressing the idea that these are the systematic elements that the two variables have in





where PM is the fraction of the variance of M, and PY, the fraction of the variance of Y,
contributed by the systematic or permanent component. (This is the notation of A Theory of
the Consumption Function, which is why we use it here despite possible confusion with our
use of P to refer to price.)
In the usual description in which, for example, M is the fixed variable or measured
without error, PM is taken to be unity, and so r
2 is described as the fraction of the variance of
Yaccounted for by M, and conversely if Yis taken as the fixed variable. It is now clear why
these cannot both simultaneously be valid. However, they are lower limits, since PYand PM
must both be less than unity, and hence each separately must be between unity and r
2.
If PM = PY, then the correlation coefficient itself can be described as the "fraction of their
variability the two variables have in common," but this too is a highly special case, since
there is no reason in general why the unsystematic element should be the same fraction of
the total variability for the two variables. Note that the unsystematic element includes pure174 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
The slightly higher correlation for the United States than for the
United Kingdom is somewhat misleading. The correlation is higher only
because there is more variation in both money and income in the United
States than in the United Kingdom, not because there is a closer relation
between money and income. It has long been noted that economic
fluctuations in the United States have both a greater frequency and a
greater amplitude than in the United Kingdom. This is reflected in the
consistently and substantially higher standard deviations of the rates of
change for both money and income for the United States than for the
United Kingdom (table 5.6, lines 4 and 5; the only exception is for
post-World War I peacetime years for money). Hence there is more
variation to be accounted for in the United States.
The comparative closeness of the relation between money and income
in the two countries can be judged better by comparing standard errors of
estimate: the variation in the rate of change in income when allowance is
made for the concomitant systematic variation in the rate of change of
money, and, conversely, the variation in the rate of change of money
when allowance is made for the concomitant systematic variation of
income. Lines 7 and 8 of table 5.6 give upper limits to the size of this
residual variability. Lines 9 and 10 give an estimate of the residual
variability on the assumption that the nonsystematic element is equally
important for money and for income.
2
9 Despite the lower correlation for
the United Kingdom, these estimates of the nonsystematic variability,
like the initial variability, are smaller in the United Kingdom than in the
United States for the period as a whole, though of course the difference is
less for the nonsystematic than for the initial variability. The lower
error of measurement. For the United States, for example, our judgment is that such errors
of measurement account for a larger fraction of the variance of Y than of M.
The statement that M and Y have a systematic component in common says nothing about
direction of influence. It might be that the influence runs either way or both ways or that
both systematic components are the common consequences of still other variables.
29. To continue with the preceding note, the standard error of estimate of Y given M,
which is usually described as the variation in Y not accounted for by M, is obtained by
assuming that PM = 1; and similarly aM.Y by assuming that PY = 1. Both these assumptions cannot be simultaneously valid, hence both of these "residual" standard errors cannot be
simultaneously valid. A better interpretation is that each is the maximum unsystematic
error, obtained by assuming that all unsystematic variation is in the particular variable in
question.
If PM = PY, then the variance of the nonsystematic component is given by (1 - r) rather
than (1 - r
2) times the variance of the measured variable. This assumption has been used in
computing the entries in lines 9 and 10 of table 5.6.
If PM>PY, then the corresponding standard deviation for M would be smaller and for Y
larger, and conversely if PM<PY.
Despite their unconventionality, we believe that the numbers computed on the assump-
tion that PM = PY give a less biased indication of the size of the nonsystematic component
than the maximum estimates in lines 7 and 8.175 Rates of Change of Money, Income and Prices
variability for the United Kingdom for the period as a whole is produced
by the pre-1914 period.
The residual or nonsystematic variability consists of two very different
elements: pure errors of measurement—these might be called the
stochastic statistical element; and variability in income and money attri-
butable to variables that do not affect them alike—this might be called
the stochastic economic element. For the United Kingdom, for the period
before 1914, the extensive use of interpolation particularly for the income
data, probably produces a negative correlation between the statistical
and the economic elements, and so biases sharply downward both the
initial and the residual variation. Though we suspect, on historical
grounds, that the nonsystematic variability was decidedly greater in the
United States during this period than in the United Kingdom, we also
suspect that the very wide difference recorded in table 5.6 overestimates
the difference between the two countries, because of the difference in the
statistical characteristics of the United Kingdom and the United States
estimates.
For the entire period after 1914, for which the statistical difficulties are
less serious, the residual variation is greater for the United Kingdom than
for the United States for money but less for income, but both differences
are small and not statistically significant. However, this equality too is
misleading, reflecting primarily the greater impact of the two wars on the
United Kingdom. For post-World War I peacetime years, the nonsys-
tematic variation in the rates of change of money and income are both
significantly larger (at the .05 level or a more stringent significance level)
for the United Kingdom than for the United States, the reverse of the
earlier relation, but again not inconsistent with the historical impression
that, in recent decades, the United Kingdom has become the less stable
economy.
The velocity series plotted in chart 5.4 is, by definition, the vertical
difference between the other two series.
3
0 The high correlation between
the rates of change of money and income implies that the rate of change
of velocity has a smaller amplitude of fluctuation than either of them—as
it uniformly does (see lines 4, 5, and 6 in table 5.6). Indeed, the reader's
first impression may well be, as ours was, that the fluctuations in velocity
are surprisingly large in view of the similarity of movements of the money
30. Since V=YIM,
log V = log y-logM,
so
A logV _ A log Y A log M
At At At
Our rates of change assume continuous compounding and hence are equal to these rates of
change in the (natural) logarithms.176 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
and income series. The reason is partly that the velocity series fluctuates
most at those periods when the other two series are fluctuating most, so
the larger differences between the other two series are overshadowed by
their common violent movement, and partly that the velocity series
reflects the nonsystematic components of both the other series. There is
clearly much variation in velocity requiring attention—but clearly also
the rigid quantity theory assumption of a strictly constant velocity is not a
bad first approximation for movements lasting more than two or three
years.
Any measurement error or nonsystematic fluctuation in the rate of
change of income enters with the same sign into the rate of change of
velocity and hence will tend to produce a positive correlation between the
income and velocity series. Conversely, any error or fluctuation in the
rate of change of money enters with the opposite sign into the rate of
change of velocity and hence will tend to produce a negative correlation
between the money and velocity series. These expectations are fulfilled in
sixteen of the twenty correlations in table 5.6. Two of the exceptions are
trivial (United Kingdom, pre-World War I, and United States, post-
World War I). The substantial positive correlation between the rate of
change of velocity and of money for United States peacetime years, after
World War I, reflects the much larger variation in the income than in the
money series, so that its fluctuations dominate the velocity correlations.
3
1

















For Tyy to be positive and rVM negative, the requisite condition is that both
*LtL and ZZ. be greater than rYM, which generally is the case in table 5.6.177 Rates of Change of Money, Income and Prices
Perhaps the most remarkable feature about the rate of change of
velocity, as about its level, is the extraordinary similarity of movement in
the two countries. Chart 5.5 superimposes the two separate levels of
velocity series from chart 5.2 and the two rates of change of velocity series
from chart 5.4. The parallelism for levels and the near identity for rates of
change is striking. The rate-of-change series for the two countries are
almost duplicates, except for the early period. The loose relation before
World War I may reflect statistical defects, particularly the role of inter-
polation in the United Kingdom figures that produce such a stable rate of
change of velocity, or looser links between the two countries than they
were destined to become. Thereafter, the only notable discrepancy
comes after World War II, when the peak rate of rise of velocity came
later in the United Kingdom than in the United States and remained
higher until 1970. The obvious explanation is the more severe economic
impact of both wars in the United Kingdom than in the United States and
hence a sharper and longer reaction.
This striking similarity in the movement of velocity in the two countries
is of the greatest importance. It means that no explanation of these
movements is acceptable that depends on conditions special to each
country separately. The two countries have clearly been part of a single
monetary order in which major velocity movements have reflected in-
fluences common to the two countries.
Chart 5.6, the counterpart of chart 5.3, shows rates of change for the
components of the money and income series of chart 5.4. Population
clearly accounts for only a minor part of the fluctuation in the money and
income series. For the United States, only World War I, the Great
Contraction, and the post-World War II baby boom leave an appreciable
impress on the rates of change of population when they are plotted on the
same scale as the other series; for the United Kingdom, only World War
I, the twenties, and recent years do.
The next two panels for each country, each containing a pair of series,
real income per capita, and real money per capita in panel B, and prices
and money stock per unit of output in panel C, are derived from the
aggregate money and income series by deflating both by the same vari-
ables—population and prices, in panel B, and aggregate real income, in
panel C. Hence, in each panel the difference between the two series is
precisely equal to the difference between the money and income series of
chart 5.4, which is to say, equal to the velocity series of that chart.
The elimination of price and population movements leaves much
variability in the rates of change in money and income, though for both
countries the real magnitudes in chart 5.6, panel B, are much less variable
than the original nominal magnitudes in chart 5.4, and also than the
nominal series in chart 5.6, panel C, which relate prices to the money
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Chart 5.5 United States and United Kingdom velocity: levels and rates of
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Chart 5.6 Rates of change of United States and United Kingdom popula-
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panel C are more highly correlated than the two in panel B. The chart
thus illustrates our earlier conclusion that the common fluctuations in the
rates of change of the stock of money and of nominal income are largely a
price phenomenon. However, the chart also underlines the no less in-
teresting fact that the common fluctuations are not solely a price phe-
nomenon. For the United States in particular, the real magnitudes in
panel B and not only the nominal magnitudes in panel C move together.
For the United Kingdom, there may be some tendency in this direction,
but it is much more muted.
This important issue can be examined more clearly in chart 5.7, which
plots the rate of change of money (reproduced from chart 5.4) against the
rate of change of prices and of real income (reproduced from chart 5.6),
the two components of the nominal income series plotted in chart 5.4.
For the United States, it is striking how closely the movements in the
stock of money series parallel the movements in real income; indeed, in
terms of short-term movements there seems to be, if anything, a closer
relation between the movements in money and in real income than
between the movements in money and prices. Note, for example, how
the bulge in the money series for the triplet of phases centered on 1910-11
(plotted at 1 January 1911) is matched by a corresponding bulge in the
output series, but not in the price series,
3
2 and how much closer the
parallelism between money and output is from 1923 to 1939 than between
money and prices. The reason the correlation coefficient between money
and real income (.620 for the period as a whole) is nonetheless lower than
between money and prices (.785) is the failure of the real income series to
follow the longer period and larger shifts in the money series as closely as
the price series does. For example, when the money series shifts from one
level before 1896 to another level thereafter, the price series follows the
shift, whereas the real income series does not. Precisely the same differ-
ence emerges after World War I when the money series shifts to a lower
level. As we noted in A Monetary History, longer-period movements in
rates of change of money are paralleled mainly by corresponding move-
ments in prices, not in real output.
3
3 However, chart 5.7 makes it clear
that at least for the United States the periods over which rates of change
of money and real output move together are of considerably longer
duration than individual business cycles.
32. This particular parallelism is so striking that it seemed worth checking to be sure that
it did not simply reflect an error in deflation, which recorded what was in fact a variation in
prices as variation in output. Accordingly, we computed rates of change, 1869-1914, for two
indexes constructed by Edwin Frickey (Production in the United States, 1860-1914 [Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1947], pp. 54,127), both based on physical-quantity data,
measuring production for manufacture and industrial and commercial production. The rate
of change movements in the two series parallel those in real income after 1890, and show the
same distinctive bulge for the triplet of phases centered on 1910-11.
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prices, and real income.183 Rates of Change of Money, Income, and Prices
The United Kingdom chart is more difficult to read than the United
States chart, but when its story is extracted it turns out to be very much
the same. The key difficulty in reading the chart is the greater violence
done by two world wars to the United Kingdom than to the United States
economy. Consider first the period before World War I. For that period,
the money line nearly duplicates the real income series except for the
early years. Consider next the period between the two wars. For that
period, all three curves are remarkably parallel; but again, as for the
United States, if anything, the real income and money series are more
closely related, except for the sharp drop from before to after 1928 in the
level of the real income curve that makes the computed correlation
between the money rates of change and real income rates of change
negative (-.308).
Consider next the two world wars. Both countries show very much the
same pattern in rates of growth of money and prices: in World War I,
sharp and parallel rises of almost the same amount and a subsequent very
sharp fall; in World War II, a rise and subsequent fall in money and prices
but a much sharper rise and fall in money than in prices, and with the fall
in the rate of price change spread over a longer period in the United
Kingdom. The behavior of real income differs much more between the
countries: in the United States, an initial rise, then decline in both wars;
in the United Kingdom, decline throughout the wars. For both countries,
the relation between money and real income is much looser for these
wartime periods than for the other periods. However, these wartime
movements are much larger in amplitude compared with the peacetime
movements for the United Kingdom than for the United States. Hence
they dominate our first impression of the charts—and also computed
correlation coefficients—for the United Kingdom far more than for the
United States. For the United States, as noted, the correlation between
the rates of change of money and real income is positive for the period as
a whole (.620); for the United Kingdom it is negative ( - .294). However,
if the war periods are excluded, the correlation is positive though negligi-
ble for the United Kingdom (.027) and significantly higher for the United
States (.802).
The economic relations that prevailed during the war years—and par-
ticularly World War II—were no doubt very different than during other
times. Price controls, physical rationing and unavailability of goods, the
direction of so large a fraction of resources to military use, the wide-
spread expectations of a very different future than present—all no doubt
altered the impact of monetary change on real output and prices. How-
ever, in addition to such real differences in economic relations, we have
great doubts about the accuracy of our series during this period, particu-
larly our price series. Price control meant that price increases took
indirect and concealed forms not recorded in the indexes; the large rise in184 Movements of Money, Income, and Prices
price indexes when price control was repealed consisted largely of an
unveiling of the earlier concealed increases. Hence the price indexes
understate the price rise during the war and overstate the price rise after
the war. Similarly, price controls in the United States from 1971 to 1973
and in the United Kingdom from 1966 to 1974 distort the reported price
indexes.
We have attempted to adjust our price series during World War II and
during post-World War II peacetime years for these defects (see sees.
4.1.3 and 4.2.3), but we are far from certain that our adjustments are
adequate. We suspect that wartime controls produced errors in the
nominal income series and not only in its division into prices and output—
this surely was the case insofar as controls stimulated black market and
other unrecorded transactions. Hence, in many of the sections that follow




The relation between money and real income is considered in much
greater detail in chapter 9. We there find that the relation is rather
different than might appear given the preceding summary of this chapter.
Not only the wars but also the great contractions turn out to produce
something of an optical illusion.
5.4 Conclusion
The broad descriptions of the secular movements in money, income,
prices, and velocity in the earlier sections of this chapter bring out sharply
three phenomena that require further interpretation: first, the common
movement of nominal money and nominal income; second, the largely
common movement in velocity in the United States and in the United
Kingdom; third, the rather different relations in the two countries be-
























27 1919-20 14 1919-20 39 1946-48 26 1946-51
Rate of exchange observations exclude in addition to those listed above the preceding and
following phases:
24 1913-14 11 1913-14 36 1937-38 23 1937-38
28 1920-21 15 1920-21 40 1948-49 27 1951-52
The reason for including the additional phases is that the rate of change triplet centered, for
example, on 1914-18 is based on 1913-14, 1914-18, and 1918-19.185 Conclusion
tween movements in money, on the one hand, and real income and prices
on the other. Succeeding chapters explore these phenomena more fully.
5.5 Appendix: Basic Phase Data
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 give phase average values for our basic data set for
the United States and the United Kingdom. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 give the
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